The mismatch between credit ratings of structured finance transactions and their true risks has been a source of the Global Financial Crisis which manifested in criticism of models and techniques applied by credit rating agencies (CRA). This paper provides an empirical study which assesses the historical performance of credit ratings for structured finance transactions and finds that CRAs do not include all factors explaining securitization impairment risk. In addition, CRA ratings for selected asset categories underestimate risk in origination years when the fee revenue is high.
Introduction
This paper compares and analyzes cross-sectional and time-series characteristics of credit rating agency (CRA) ratings, implied impairment rate estimates and realized impairment rates of asset portfolio securitizations (structured finance transactions). This is of highest importance as past shortcomings may have been instrumental to past, current and future loss rates of financial institutions in relation to securitizations. Structured finance ratings and associated fee revenue have experienced an unprecedented growth in past years and dominate today in terms of numbers as well as CRA fee revenue.
2
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) led to an unprecedented and unexpected increase of impairment and loss rates for securitizations. The disappointment of investors manifested in the criticism of models applied by credit rating agencies (CRAs). Examples are VECTOR from Fitch rating agency (see Fitch Ratings 2006) , CDOROM from Moody's rating agency (see Moody's Investors Service 2006) and CDO Evaluator from Standard and Poor's rating agency (see Standard & Poor's 2005) . Similar critique has been put forward after the South East Asian Crisis of 1997 in relation to corporate bond issuer and bond issue credit ratings. For example, Leot et al. (2008) find that ratings follow rather than predict the crisis as systematic downgrades have occurred subsequent to the crisis.
Securitizations involve the sale of assets into bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicles, which are funded by investors of different seniorities (tranches). Based on the nature of the securitized asset portfolios, important transaction types include asset-backed securities (ABSs), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), home equity loan-backed securities (HEL) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Despite their name, securitizations are generally over-the-counter contracts and involve funded as well as unfunded risk transfers. Therefore, no secondary market prices are available. Counterparties publish accounting values for funded, and to a lesser degree for unfunded transactions.
3 Information is generally available to measure the risk of securitizations and includes credit ratings, impairment histories and proxies for the asset portfolio risk such as asset value indices or cash flow indices. The evaluation of individual risks, their dependence structure and derivatives (i.e., the funded or unfunded exposures of investors and guarantors) is complicated by the low liquidity of the underlying assets, the unavailability of secondary markets and the recent origination of such transactions.
Two main streams exist in literature on the measurement of financial risks of securitizations. The first stream focuses on the pricing of structured finance transactions where the central issue is to explain observed (market) prices such as credit spreads of credit default swap (CDS) indices. The most prominent examples are the CDX North America and iTraxx Europe indices, which reference firm portfolios. These indices were originated in 2003 and 2004 . Credit spreads for the index as well as tranches are available daily. Longstaff & Rajan (2008) and Hull & White (2004) apply a risk-neutral pricing framework to develop pricing techniques for these spreads. A central point of these risk models is the specification of the dependence structure for the portfolio assets.
The second stream is concerned with the modeling and estimation of risk characteristics of the underlying asset portfolio without relying on market prices. The focus is on the derivation of the distribution of future asset values (or losses) based on individual risk parameters. In the case of a loan portfolio, the relevant parameters are default probabilities, loss rates given default, exposures at default and dependence parameters such as correlations or more general copulas. Merton (1974) , Leland (1994) , Jarrow & Turnbull (1995) , Longstaff & Schwartz (1995) , Madan & Unal (1995) , Leland & Toft (1996) , Jarrow et al. (1997) , Duffie & Singleton (1999) , Shumway (2001) , McNeil & Wendin (2007) and Duffie et al. (2007) address the default likelihood. Dietsch & Petey (2004) and McNeil & Wendin (2007) model the correlations between default events. Carey (1998) , Acharya et al. (2007) , Pan & Singleton (2008) , Qi & Yang (2009) and Grunert & Weber (2009) develop economically motivated empirical models for recoveries using explanatory co-variables. Altman et al. (2005) model correlations between default events and loss rates given default.
Within this stream, credit ratings are often used as explanations of financial risk. Ratings measure the financial risk of corporate bond issuers, corporate bond issues, sovereigns and structured finance issues. In the contemporary climate of the Global Financial Crisis, the role and importance of ratings to all market participants (e.g., issuers, investors and regulators), while controversial, is beyond question. Previous research focuses on the degree to which corporate credit rating changes introduce new information. For example, Radelet & Sachs (1998) find that rating changes are pro-cyclical. This suggests that they provide only a limited amount of new information to the market. Ederington & Goh (1993) , Dichev & Piotroski (2001) and Purda (2007) find that corporate credit rating downgrades provide news to the market. Jorion et al. (2005) show that after Regulation Fair Disclosure, the market impact of both downgrades and upgrades is significant and of greater magnitude compared to that observed in the pre-Regulation Fair Disclosure period. The relative roles of different CRAs have also been studied. For example, Miu & Ozdemir (2002) examine the effect of divergent Moody's and S&P ratings of banks.
With regard to the GFC, Rajan et al. (2008) show that omission of soft information in ratings can lead to substantial model risk. Mayer et al. (2008) find that the decline of housing prices was responsible for increasing sub-prime mortgage delinquency rates. Benmelech & Dlugosz (2008) analyze collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) rated by Standard and Poor's and find a mismatch between credit ratings and the quality of the underlying loan portfolios. Crouhy et al. (2008) point out that CRAs' fee revenues depend on the number of ratings and may be supported by higher ratings. Similarly, Franke & Krahnen (2008) argue that incentive effects have played an important role in the GFC, particularly associated with the allocation of equity tranches of securitizations. Hull (2009) and Hellwig (2008) identify deficient CRA models as a cause of the GFC.
Unfortunately, the literature has not yet analyzed CRA ratings of securitizations and their accuracy. This paper addresses this shortcoming. Based on the rating and impairment data of one CRA, cross-sectional and time-series characteristics of ratings, implied impairment rate estimates and realized impairment rates of asset portfolio securitizations are compared and analyzed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a framework for the financial risk in securitizations and develops hypotheses, consistent with the current literature in relation to the risk and uncertainty of CRA assessments. Section 3 describes the data used in the study and analyzes the central hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the major ramifications of the empirical results for risk models for securitizations and provides suggestions in relation to a new stability framework for financial markets, institutions and instruments.
Model Framework and Hypothesis Development

Model for the asset pool
Structured finance transactions are investments in special purpose companies investing the funds in a portfolio of assets. These investments cover, within legal maturities, losses to the asset portfolio in excess of a retention (also known as attachment or subordination level) and up to a limit (also known as detachment level). The paper refers to the entire transaction as 'deal' and the individual investment segment as 'tranche'. In other words, one transaction may consist of one or more tranches of various seniority levels. The asset portfolio of a deal generally consists of financial assets (e.g., loans) that are subject to financial risk (e.g., credit risk).
The major CRA models to evaluate structured finance transactions share a similar structure. Following Gordy (2000) , Gordy (2003) , McNeil & Wendin (2007) , and Gupton et al. (1997) (CreditMetrics), credit risk of an individual borrower is modeled by a Gaussian factor model for the individual asset return based on Merton (1974) . The assumption is made that borrowers are pooled into portfolios such that firms in the pool share a common systematic risk factor (see Gordy & Howells 2006) . Let R kt denote the asset return of borrower k in time period t belonging to asset pool i (k = 1, ..., K; t = 1, ..., T ; i = 1, ..., I) which is generated by the following process
where X it and ε kt are standard normally distributed pool specific and idiosyncratic risk factors and ρ is a parameter denoting the correlation between asset returns which measures the strength of association between borrowers within the pool. The factors are assumed to be serially independent and independent from each other A default event occurs if the asset return R kt falls below a threshold c it . The threshold may be interpreted as the credit quality. It is assumed that all assets in a portfolio are of equal credit quality c it at time t for a given risk segment. 4 A borrower default event then occurs if
where D kt is an indicator variable with
Under the normality assumption of the model the probability of default is π it = Φ(c it ) where Φ(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. K it assets are pooled to an asset portfolio i and the pool default rate is the average over the default indicators defined as
For a large number of assets in the pool the pool default rate converges against the 'Vasicek'-distribution (see Vasicek 1987 , 1991 , Gordy 2000 , 2003 with density
where Φ −1 (.) is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The default rate has the cumulative distribution function (see eg. Bluhm et al. 2003 )
P it in Equation (5) and Equation (6) can also be interpreted as loss rate (rather than the default rate) of the portfolio when loss rates given default are deterministic and equal to unity.
Model for the tranche default
Next, consider the structuring of a transaction into several tranches. A tranche j (j = 1, ..., J i ) of pool i experiences a loss and therefore an impairment if the default rate P it in the portfolio exceeds the relative subordination level (or attachment level) AL ijt
where D ijt is an indicator variable with
The relative attachment level is calculated by the ratio of the attachment level (in $) and the deal principal (in $) of period t. As a result of this definition, impaired tranches of previous years have reduced both the attachment level as well as the deal principal. The probability of a tranche impairment is thus
Inserting Equation (9) into Equation (6) and replacing c it by Φ −1 (π t ) results in
where
Note that this probability is unconditional with respect to the pool specific factors, i.e. it does not assume that their realizations are known ex ante. Equation (10) implies that the tranche impairment probability is a function of the
• Average portfolio asset quality;
• Asset correlation;
• Attachment level of a tranche relative to the total deal principal.
A credit rating measuring the impairment risk of a securitized tranche should thus account for these factors to explain tranche impairment probabilities. On the other hand, if a rating omits information, then additional information besides the rating may explain the tranche impairment probability. Examples may relate to the asset portfolio quality, the securitization structure as well as observable information about the business cycle. Consider an error in assigning one or more of the pool parameters resulting in η ijt = η ijt which will lead to a bias in the estimated impairment probability. Then the impairment probability can be written as
with ∆ η ≡ η ijt − η ijt denoting the measurement error in pool variables which may refer to characteristics of the pool, the tranche or time. Model (11) will provide the basis for the empirical tests in the later sections.
Hypotheses development
The following hypotheses aim to answer whether CRA structured finance ratings (from now on referenced as 'ratings') are inaccurate and may have been causal for the Global Financial Crisis. Based on the stylized model and the previous research, the hypotheses are as follows:
• H1a: Ratings represent the average asset quality of the asset portfolio;
• H1b: Ratings represent structured finance transaction characteristics such as resecuritization status, subordination level and transaction cash flow structure; • H2: Ratings include macroeconomic information; • H3a: Rating standards have not declined over time;
• H3b: Ratings predict impairment risk;
• H4: Ratings indicate low risk in origination years and high risk in monitoring years.
The hypotheses H1a and H1b relate to idiosyncratic, H2 to systematic and H3a and H3b to the interaction between idiosyncratic and systematic risk characteristics of securitizations. H4 relates to incentive mechanisms induced by the fee structure for securitization ratings.
H1a addresses characteristics of the asset portfolio. Rajan et al. (2008) find that securitization risk models omit 'soft' information. This implies that the CRA ratings, relying on such models, mis-evaluate the average credit quality of the asset portfolio. Crouhy et al. (2008) suggest that CRAs did not monitor raw data, CRAs were tardy in recognizing the implications of the declining state of the sub-prime market for the ratings of monoline insurers, CRAs were paid by clients for ratings and that CRA competition is limited by regulation. Important drivers of asset portfolio risk may be ratings as well as other asset portfolio characteristics.
H1b addresses the tranching structure of securitizations and the current discussion on the appropriate specification of the dependence structure of various assets in a portfolio (compare Hull 2009 , Hellwig 2008 . The probability distribution as well as the percentiles of losses associated with the pool are particularly sensitive to the correlations in the underlying asset pool. Thus, the level of subordination may be a key driver if correlations are mis-specified and should explain tranche impairments after controlling for credit ratings.
H2 identifies the degree to which business cycles are included in CRA risk models. Previous research has analyzed whether CRA ratings for corporate issuer and bond issue ratings address the state of the economy (point-in-time rating) or not (through-the-cycle rating). An analysis of both rating paradigms is given in Loeffler (2004) . While through-the-cycle ratings are often more stable through time, (see Nickell et al. 2000) , they may react too slowly in economic up-or downturns. Franke & Krahnen (2008) argue that sensitivities to macroeconomic factors may be higher for securitized tranches than for corporate bonds.
H3a relates to a hypothesis suggested by various authors (e.g., Crouhy et al. 2008 ) that lending standards have declined in recent years. Blume et al. (1998) present a similar hypothesis for corporate bond issuers. Rajan et al. (2008) analyze individual securitized sub-prime mortgage loans and assess the performance of the FICO score 5 and loan-to-value ratio for the prediction of mortgage default events. They find that the default model performs poorly in times of higher securitization. Downing et al. (2008) present evidence for declining subordination levels for commercial MBSs.
H3b addresses the information degree of credit ratings. Hellwig (2008) argues that the omission of systematic factors related to real-estate prices such as interest rates and the availability of housing finance may have led to an overoptimism of valuations and ratings. Such expectations may be adjusted in an economic downturn.
H4 addresses a potential conflict of interest of rating agencies. Crouhy et al. (2008) argue that CRA fees are paid by issuers. This may imply that the credit quality measured by CRAs and CRA fee revenue are positively correlated. However, CRAs publish default and rating migration tables, which are used to calibrate ratings to metric risk measures. Thus, a systematic 'rating for fee' policy would be noticed and priced by investors when analyzing the financial risk in relation to ratings. Generally speaking, the fee revenue of rating agencies is high when the first rating is generated (origination year) and low in later years when ratings are revisited (monitoring years). 6 In addition, the fees in relation to origination and monitoring years are often paid upfront despite their lagged recognition as accounting income. As a result, CRAs may have an incentive to assign i) low risk ratings in origination years to increase fee revenue and ii) high risk ratings in monitoring years to maintain stable default and rating migration performance measures. These measures are generally calculated as an average per rating class or per observation year. (1) Transaction observations which cannot be placed into the categories ABS, CDO, CMBS, HEL or RMBS. These are mainly asset backed commercial paper, structured covered bonds, catastrophe bonds, and derivative product companies (22.0% of original number of observations are deleted); (2) Transaction observations where the monetary volume and therefore relative credit enhancement and thickness of individual tranches could not be determined without setting additional assumptions due to i) multiple currency tranches and ii) missing senior unfunded tranche characteristics (13.5% of original number of observations are deleted); (3) Transaction observations which are not based on the currency USD or transaction observations which are not originated in the USA (5.0% of original number of observations are deleted); (4) Tranche observations which relate to years prior to 1997 due to a limited number of impairment events (7.3% of original number of observations are deleted). Impairment events are the focus of this paper and years prior to 1997 have experienced few impairment events. Years after 2008 are unavailable at the time of writing this paper; (5) Tranche observations which have experienced an impairment event in prior years (0.2% of original number of observations are deleted).
The resulting data comprises 325,443 annual tranche observations. The number of impaired tranche observations is 13,072 while the original data set included 15,083 impairment events before the application of filtering rules.
The following categorical variables were generated:
• Impairment (1: impairment, 0: no impairment) indicates that a tranche is impaired in the observation year; • Rating at the origination of the transaction (Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa-C) reflects the expected loss of a tranche and is measured at the beginning of an observation year;
• Rating at the beginning of the respective year (Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa-C) reflects the expected loss of a tranche and is measured at the beginning of an observation year; • Deal category (ABS: asset backed security, CDO: collateralized debt obligation, CMBS: commercial mortgage-backed security, HEL: home equity loan security, RMBS: residential mortgage-backed security); • Original Rating Year (ORY; 1: transaction is originated, 0: transaction is not originated)
indicates whether the transaction is originated and rated for the first time by the CRA in the observation year; • Principal Payment Year (PPY; 1: principal is repayable, 0: principal is not repayable)
indicates whether principal is repayable in the observation year; • Resecuritization (1: resecuritization, 0: no resecuritization) indicates whether a transaction is a resecuritization of previous transactions. These transactions are often called 'squared' (e.g., CDO-squared). The database allowed for the identification of resecuritizations for CDO and MBS transactions; • Relative subordination level (Junior, Mezzanine and Senior) indicates the subordination level relative to the average impairment rate of an asset class (see below).
The relative subordination level (RSUB) is divided into the levels 'Junior', 'Mezzanine' and 'Senior':
with the multiplier k and the average impairment rate IR j of asset class j with j ∈ {ABS, CDO, HEL, M BS}. The empirical analysis applies a multiplier of k = 2.
8 Table I and Table II describe the number of observations over time. The overall number of rated securitizations has increased at an increasing rate over time. Similar observations may be made for the value of securitizations.
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[insert Table I [insert Table II here] Table I shows the relative frequency of rating categories at origination (Panel A) and at the beginning of the observation year (Panel B). In both Panels, the average rating quality deteriorates over time as the relative frequency of the rating category Aaa declined. This may reflect i) a deterioration of the average asset portfolio quality, ii) a higher average risk level induced by the securitization structure (e.g., subordination, thickness or features such as embedded options, which are not addressed in this paper) or iii) a change of the rating process. Table II shows the relative frequency of deal and transaction characteristics. Deal characteristics (Panel A) include the asset portfolio type and the resecuritization status. Generally speaking, asset portfolio securitizations are relatively heterogeneous despite the contribution by the International Swap and Derivatives Dealer Association by providing transaction templates. Retail asset portfolios generally comprise a large number of exposure amounts (e.g., 100,000) with small exposures (e.g., $100,000) and are mainly exposed to systematic risk. Corporate/wholesale asset portfolios comprise a smaller number (e.g., 100) of exposures with large exposure amounts (e.g., $10 million) and may be exposed to idiosyncratic as well as systematic risk. ABSs generally comprise retail asset portfolios (e.g., auto, credit card and student loans) as well as corporate/wholesale asset portfolios (e.g., equipment loans and leases). CDOs generally comprise corporate/wholesale asset portfolios (e.g., unsecured or secured corporate loan exposures). HELs include retail sub-prime mortgage portfolios while MBSs generally relate to prime mortgage portfolios of commercial (CMBS) and residential (RMBS) real estate loans. This is of high relevance as the impairment rate for HELs (next to CDOs) has increased over-proportionately. Resecuritizations have decreased over time.
Transaction characteristics (Table II , Panel B) include the subordination level, the origination year and the principal payment year The relative frequency of mezzanine tranches has increased and the one of senior tranches has decreased. Origination years increased over time and sharply dropped in 2008 due to the Global Financial Crisis. The relative frequency of principal payment years is very cyclical as investors change their maturity preferences over time.
Generally speaking, the validation of credit ratings is complicated as the use of ratings involves two steps: firstly the ordinal assessments of the financial risk of issuers or issues by CRAs and secondly the calibration of these ordinal ratings to metric credit risk measures such as default rates, loss rates given default or unconditional loss rates. This calibration step is generally opaque as investors rely on impairment rate tables. These tables aggregate the impairment events over dimensions such as rating or observation year. The data set enables the estimation of impairment risk based on the most detailed information level, i.e., the individual transaction in a given observation year. Table III and Table IV [insert Table III here] [insert Table IV here] Table III shows that impairment rates for rating categories at origination (Panel A) and at the beginning of the observation year (Panel B). In both Panels, the impairment rate increases for lower rating categories (i.e., from Aaa-A to Caa) and fluctuate over time. Please note that inconsistencies (e.g., a higher impairment rate for a lower risk rating in a selected year) may reflect the stochastic nature of impairment events. The latter is particularly relevant if the number of observations is low for a given category. 3.2 H1a: Ratings represent the average asset quality of the asset portfolio A major concern with regard to the GFC is that current credit portfolio risk models, including the models used by CRAs, do not capture credit portfolio risk accurately. If credit ratings correctly assess the impairment risk of a tranche, then the tranche impairment probability should solely be explained by the ratings. In other words, if ratings reflect the tranche impairment probability accurately, they should include the information as specified in Equation (10). Alternatively, any additional significant information indicates that ratings omit information.
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The impairment of tranche j (j = 1, ..., J i ) of pool i (i = 1, ..., I) in time t (t = 1, ..., T ) is linked with observable information by the probit regression.
where x ijt is a vector of observable and thus known variables. β is the respective vector of sensitivities and includes an intercept. The models may be used for forecasting as the CRA ratings are measured at the beginning of the observation year. Note that the left hand side is the same probability as in Equation (10). If ratings fully explain the impairment probability, then no other variable besides the ratings should be significant in the probit regression.
Table V presents in Column 1 and Column 2 two probit models linking the impairment. Model 1 (Column 1) takes the dummy-coded ratings provided by CRAs into account. Rating Aaa-A is the reference category. As measures for in-sample accuracy of the models the Pseudo-R 2 , re-scaled R 2 , and the area under the receiver operating characteristic (AUROC) are calculated (see Agresti 1984) . The parameter estimates increase from rating Aaa-A to rating Caa. This demonstrates the predictive power of ratings. Model 2 (Column 2) includes the ratings as well as the dummy-coded type of the underlying asset portfolios. The impairment likelihood of HEL is larger than CDO, which is larger than MBS, which is larger than ABS (the reference category).
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[insert Table V here]
In summary, CRAs do not take all available asset portfolio information into account. Important ramifications are that i) CRAs may have to include asset portfolio characteristics into the rating models and ii) investors should apply asset portfolio specific impairment rates to ratings when interpreting CRA ratings.
3.3 H1b: Ratings represent structured finance transaction characteristics such as resecuritization status, subordination level and transaction cash flow structure
In order to test the hypothesis whether CRAs mis-specify structured finance transaction characteristics, three additional variables are included:
• Resecuritization: the variable indicates whether the transaction consists of a resecuritized asset portfolio. Hull (2009) suggests that resecuritizations contributed to the increased number of impaired structured finance transactions. Resecuritizations were originated to create a market for mezzanine tranches. Mezzanine tranches are generally less popular amongst investors. Thus a resecuritization often involves the tranching of a portfolio of mezzanine investment tranches. To date, no empirical evidence is available as to whether ratings for resecuritizations have the same information content as ratings for primary securitizations; • Subordination: the metric variable represents the subordination level of the observed tranche and relates to an ongoing discussion of whether CRAs apply reasonable levels of asset correlations. Asset correlations measure the dependence between the asset performances of the portfolio underlying the transaction and are an important input parameter in the risk models of CRAs as well as many financial institutions; • Principal payment year (PPY): securitizations may be more likely to be impaired in the principal payment year than in an interest payment year. Column 3) , ii) decreaeses significantly if the subordination increases (Model 4, see column 4) and iii) increases significantly in principal payment years (Model 5, see column 5) after controlling for rating and asset portfolio characteristics.
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The significance of the subordination may imply that the CRA risk models do not properly include the subordination level or alternatively, the distribution of portfolio losses is misspecified. In the instance of CRA risk models, this may imply that the Gaussian copula model may not reflect the empirical data or that a dependence parameter such as the asset correlation or the correlation between default events and loss given default may be mis-specified. Asset correlations are naturally asset specific.
16 Table VI shows the parameter estimates for Model 6, which includes the subordination level relative to the average impairment rate of a given asset class as defined in Equation (12).
[insert Table VI here]
The positive (negative) coefficient for 'Mezzanine' and 'Senior' exposures indicates that the risk is higher (lower) than reflected in CRA ratings. This implies that ratings underestimate (overestimate) the likelihood of losses in excess of the subordination level. An underestimation (overestimation) may be caused by the underestimation (overestimation) of positive
14 Please note that restructuring may or may not be a default criteria in risk models. 15 Model 6 (Column 6) confirms the robustness of the results by including all three variables. Interestingly, resecuritization is now significant and negative. 16 Despite the common practice to estimate implied volatilities and correlation per tranche.
correlations between underlying stochastic asset value processes or a mis-specification of functional forms such as the copula model. The empirical results for the senior tranches may suggest with regard to the asset correlations, that the standard correlation assumptions applied by CRAs should be higher for ABS and lower for CDO, HEL and MBS securitizations.
Hence, CRAs do not take all available information on structured finance transaction characteristics into account. Similar to hypothesis H1a, important ramifications are that i) CRAs may have to include structured finance transaction characteristics into their rating models and ii) investors should apply transaction structure-specific impairment rates to CRA ratings.
H2: Ratings include macroeconomic information
CRAs are known to rate 'through-the-cycle' for corporate bonds (see e.g., Loeffler 2004) and include mainly idiosyncratic characteristics. Cyclical effects or macroeconomic information are not included as the assessment of credit quality should reflect a borrower's ability to pay based on firm fundamentals and aim to avoid rating changes over time. This explicitly includes rating changes induced by changes of the general economy. Omitting businesscycle information from ratings for securitizations may lead to the observed mismatch of the time-constant rating and cyclical impairment risk. In other words, the probit relation of Equation (13) between ratings and the impairment probability is distorted by time varying risk characteristics which are not included in the ratings.
In a next step, the model framework is extended to dependence across pools following Gordy & Howells (2006) . This is modeled by decomposing the pool specific factor into
where X * t is a univariate standard normally distributed 'super'-factor measuring the state of the economy, U it is a pool specific factor, and δ i measures the strength of dependence across pools. All factors are standard normally distributed, independent from each other and serially independent. For simplicity δ i = δ for all pools. Then the tranche impairment probability from Equation (10) can be stated as function of the systematic factor by
where b = √ δ/ √ 1 − δ is the exposure to the 'super'-factor. This model specification extends the common probit model to a probit model with random effects X * t . Given some co-variates the regression model can be stated as
The parameters are estimated by the Maximum-Likelihood method.
In a first step, the stand-alone sensitivity to systematic risk (i.e., without co-variates) is estimated. The parameter estimates (Model 7) are shown in Table VII (Panel A). The first version is based on the whole data set and serves as a base case (Column 1). The estimate for the intercept is -2.4397, the estimate for the exposure to the latent factor is 0.5127 and highly significant. This shows that tranche impairment risk is driven by the overall economy. Columns 2 to 6 estimate Model 7 for data sets, which are restricted to the same rating grade. Higher rated tranches (Aaa to Ba) are more sensitive to the economy than lower rated tranches (B and Caa). Vice versa, this implies that if economic information is omitted from the ratings, a change in macroeconomic conditions will lead to a higher discrepancy of rating and true risk for the higher rated tranches. All macroeconomic exposures are significant at the 1 per cent level.
[insert Table VII here]
Table VII (Panel B) presents the estimation results of Model 7 per deal type. All macroeconomic exposures are highly significant and there is a clear difference between asset pool types. ABSs (Column 1) and MBS (Column 3) have a lower sensitivity, CDOs (Column 2) and HELs (see column 4) have a higher exposure. Hence, HELs are more sensitive to economic downturns than other securitization categories.
Table VII (Panel C) investigates whether differences exist between resecuritized deals and primary securitizations. Such structures are known as 'tranches of tranches' or 'squared' products. The intuition is that resecuritization eliminates idiosyncratic risk and therefore tranches of tranches should be exposed to a larger degree to systematic risk (see Hull 2009 ). The results confirm that the exposure of resecuritized tranches is 0.9058 (Column 2) and more higher than for unsecuritized tranches where it is 0.5104 (Column 1). This result is reflected in Table III (Panel A) where it can be seen that in 'normal' economic times impairment rates of the resecuritised instruments which are highly exposed to systematic risk are small while they may sharply increase during an economic downturn in 2008.
After analyzing the macroeconomic exposure of tranches in general, the degree to which business cycle information is included in CRA ratings is tested (Model 8). The exposure b of the latent factor should no longer be significant after controlling for ratings if all timevarying information (e.g., business cycle information) affecting the impairment probabilities is captured by the rating. Table VIII shows the estimates for the base case model (Model 7 without ratings, Column 1) and the model controlling for the ratings (Model 8 with ratings, Column 2). The analysis shows that ratings increase the sensitivity to the business cycle. The hypothesis that CRA ratings include time-varying systematic information on the economy is rejected. In other words, CRA ratings do not explain systematic risk components.
[insert Table VIII here]
The ramifications are that the exposure to the business cycle increases i) with a CRA rating indicating lower financial risk, ii) for sub-prime mortgage loans and iii) for resecuritizations. Thus, CRA ratings should reflect the degree of systematic risk or alternatively, investors should assign time-varying impairment rates controlling for asset portfolio type and resecuritization status next to CRA ratings.
H3a: Rating standards have not declined over time
The next hypothesis addresses the critique that rating standards of CRAs may have declined over time. The deterioration of rating quality by CRAs may have been a possible reason for the GFC. This should be reflected in a declining quality of rating standards or deteriorating quality of risk forecasts from credit ratings, particularly in the years prior to the Global Financial Crisis. In other words, the implied impairment probability and thus observed impairment rate of a given rating grade may have increased over time as the impairment risk of transactions has increased. This hypothesis is tested using a fixed effects model (Model 9) of the form
where t = (year−1996) counts the number of years from the beginning of the observation period and is thus a year effect. If the sensitivity of the variable is positive, then the impairment probability of a rating grade increases over time. This may imply that in year t + 1 the same rating grade exhibits higher impairment risk than in year t. 17 Table IX shows the results for
Model 9. For all rating grades a significant positive time trend of impairment probabilities is found. For a rating grade the default probability increased through time. Therefore, the hypothesis that the rating standards have not declined over time can be rejected.
[insert Table IX here]
H3b: Ratings predict impairment risk
Ratings are generally applied as proxies for future impairment risk. The information content of corporate bond issue ratings has been analyzed by Blume et al. (1998) . However, no evidence for CRA ratings on securitizations has been presented.
The forecasting power of credit ratings is tested by an approach related to Rajan et al. (2008) . The approach proceeds in three steps. Firstly, a probit regression is estimated for each year
where x jit are dummy variables for the ratings, which are observed at the beginning of the observation period. Next, the linear predictor for the subsequent year is calculated:
and the impairment probability prediction for the subsequent year 17 Nonlinear transformations of the time-variable are included as a robustness check. The results were comparable.
using the estimated coefficientsβ from (19). Finally, the forecasting power is assessed by running a probit regression (Model 10).
If the rating provides perfect forecasts, then γ 0 = 0 and γ 1 = 1, which will be tested. As a robustness check a linear regression is estimated(Model 11):
so that E(D ijt+1 ) = P (D ijt+1 ) = δ 0 + δ 1 ·p ijt+1 where δ 0 = 0 and δ 1 = 1.
All steps are repeated for each year from 1999 to 2008 where in the probit regression (19) all data up to year t is used. It can be seen that in most years, both coefficients of either regression are statistically significant and thus different from their ideal values (Columns 1 and 2). Moreover, the respective R 2 s neither increase nor decrease throughout. This implies that the rating quality has neither consistently declined nor improved. 18 While for most years, the evidence of underprediction or overprediction is mixed, particularly the downturn years 2002, 2007 and 2008 exhibit a significant underestimation of risk by the ratings. If ratings predict impairment risk accurately, they should have anticipated the downturns and should have downgraded the transactions accordingly. However, the observation that the estimates of γ 0 and δ 0 are greater than zero indicates that impairment risk has been under-predicted by the ratings in these years. In summary, the analysis shows that the rating quality has neither consistently declined nor improved through time. In other words, there has been a mix of years of overprediction and years of underprediction of impairment risk. This indicates that CRA ratings have a limited ability to predict impairment risk.
The ramifications are that CRAs do not predict impairment risk and that investors relying on predictions of future levels of impairment risk may have to build private models. Alternatively, CRAs may easily adjust their ratings by a projection of the future state of the economy. This may be accomplished by including time-lagged variables of the level and change of the total impairment rate.
H4: Ratings indicate low risk in origination years and high risk in monitoring years
Rating agencies face a potential conflict of interest. CRAs may have an incentive to assign i) low risk ratings in origination years to increase fee revenue and ii) high risk ratings in monitoring years to maintain stationary default and rating migration performance measures over origination and monitoring years.
In order to test the hypothesis, Model 6 is extended by an origination year effect. Table XII shows the parameter estimates for the whole data set as well as the various asset classes.
[insert Table XII here]
The parameter of the dummy variable ORY is positive and significant for the categories CDO, MBS and HEL, which suggests that the impairment risk in the origination year is higher than suggested by the CRAs. These risk segments have experienced the largest impairment rate increases (and thus disappointments of investors) during the GFC. This result suggests that ratings are overoptimistic (i.e., reflect a level of risk, which is too low) in the origination year. It should also be mentioned that the parameter estimate for ABS is negative but insignificant for ABS securitizations.
In summary, the empirical analysis finds evidence that financial risk for the asset classes CDOs, MBS and HEL is higher than indicated by ratings in the original rating year. This mis-specification of financial risk coincides with high fee revenues. Fee revenues for original rating years exceed fee revenues for monitoring years and the fees for original rating and monitoring years are paid in the original rating year. 
Discussion and Outlook
To date, no empirical evidence on the accuracy of ratings and risk models for securitizations exists. The article's main objective is to analyze the impact of idiosyncratic and systematic risk characteristics on impairment risk of securitizations.
The most substantial finding is that rating agencies do not include all factors explaining securitization impairment risk. In particular, the state of the economy is not addressed as CRAs average over the business cycle. Hence, CRA ratings are unable to predict impairment risk. In addition, a recent deterioration of CRA rating standards was found. Additional results are that CRA ratings for securitizations do not fully account for the average credit quality in asset portfolios and do not fully account for structural elements of structured finance transactions. Such elements include the subordination level, the resecuritization status and principal payment years.
In response to the presented hypotheses, CRA ratings for securitizations
• Do not fully account for the average credit quality in asset portfolios;
• Do not fully account for the structure of asset securitizations;
• Reflect the average impairment risk over the business cycle: risks are assessed throughthe-cycle rather than point-in-time; • Are based on rating standards, which have systematically declined over time;
• Do not predict impairment risk;
• Under-predict financial risk in origination years and over-predict risk in monitoring years for CDOs, MBS and HELs.
The findings may not be interpreted as a critique of the valuable work CRAs provide. Please note that the major CRAs cover a large number of rated debt issuers and issues per year 20 with a limited number of financial analysts 21 . These ratings may provide useful information on the average idiosyncratic impairment risk over the business cycle.
To date, only CRAs make their financial risk measures as well as the respective realizations (e.g., impairment histories) available to the general public. Little is known of the quality of models of other vendors as well as financial institution internal models as the respective information is kept private. However, recent negative earnings announcements of financial institutions suggest that other models applied in industry may share similar properties. Tables Table I Total number of observations, relative frequencies of ratings at origination and at the beginning of the year, 1997-2008 This table shows the total number of observations and the relative frequencies of ratings at origination and at the beginning of the year. The panel data is based on structured finance transactions rated by CRA Moody's Investors Service. The following observations were excluded: i) transaction observations which can not be placed into the categories asset-backed security, collateralized debt obligation, commercial mortgage-backed security, residential mortgage-backed security or home equity loan security; ii) transaction observations where the monetary volume and therefore relative credit enhancement and thickness of individual tranches could not be determined without setting additional assumptions; iii) transaction observations which are not based on the currency USD or transaction observations which are not originated in the USA; iv) tranche observations which relate to years prior to 1997 due to a limited number of observations, v) tranche observations which have experienced an impairment event in prior years. The number of rated tranches has increased at an increasing rate. The rating quality of rated tranches has generally decreased over time as a smaller fraction of tranches are rated Aaa. Table II Total number of observations, relative frequencies of deal and transaction characteristics, 1997-2008 This table shows the total number of observations and the relative frequencies of deal and transaction characteristics. Deal characteristics are the deal category and the resecuritization status. Transaction characteristics are the subordination level, the original rating year status and the principal rating year status. The deal categories are asset backed security (ABS), collateralized debt obligation (CDO), commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS), home equity loan security (HEL) and residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS). The resecuritization status (1: resecuritization, 0: no resecuritization) indicates whether a transaction is a resecuritization of previous transactions. The Original Rating Year (ORY; 1: transaction is originated, 0: transaction is not originated) indicates whether the transaction is originated and rated for the first time by the CRA in the observation year. The Principal Payment Year (PPY; 1: principal is repayable, 0: principal is not repayable) indicates whether principal is repayable in the observation year. The relative subordination level (Junior, Mezzanine and Senior) indicates the subordination level relative to the average impairment rate of an asset class (compare Equation 12 ). The number of rated tranches has increased at an increasing rate. The relative frequency of CDO and HEL has increased. The resecuritization level has generally decreased. The relative frequency of mezzanine tranches has increased and of and senior tranches has decreased. This table shows parameter estimates from the probit models Model 1 to Model 6. The model specification is P (D ijt = 1) = Φ (β x ijt ). Standard errors are in parentheses. The significance is indicated as follows: ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. AUROC is the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (see Agresti 1984) . The deal categories are asset backed security (ABS), collateralized debt obligation (CDO), home equity loan security (HEL) and mortgage-backed security (MBS). The resecuritization status (1: resecuritization, 0: no resecuritization) indicates whether a transaction is a resecuritization of previous transactions. The Subordination indicates the fraction of tranches which are subordinate to the observed tranche. The Principal Payment Year (PPY; 1: principal is repayable, 0: principal is not repayable) indicates whether principal is repayable in the observation year. The inclusion of deal type and structural elements after controlling for credit ratings explains impairment risk. The ramifications are that CRA ratings do not sufficiently account for the average credit quality in asset portfolios and for structural elements of securitizations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) The significance is indicated as follows: ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. The parameter for resecuritisation can not be estimated for ABS and HEL as resecuritisations can not be identified for these categories. AUROC is the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (see Agresti 1984) . The deal categories are asset backed security (ABS), collateralized debt obligation (CDO), home equity loan security (HEL) and mortgage-backed security (MBS). The resecuritization status (1: resecuritization, 0: no resecuritization) indicates whether a transaction is a resecuritization of previous transactions. The Subordination indicates the fraction of tranches which are subordinate to the observed tranche. The Principal Payment Year (PPY; 1: principal is repayable, 0: principal is not repayable) indicates whether principal is repayable in the observation year. The positive (negative) coefficient for 'Mezzanine' and 'Senior' exposures indicates that the risk is higher (lower) than reflected in CRA ratings. This implies that ratings underestimate (overestimate) the likelihood of losses in excess of the subordination level. An underestimation (overestimation) may be caused by the underestimation (overestimation) of positive correlations between underlying stochastic asset value processes or a mis-specification of functional forms such as the copula model. The empirical results for the senior tranches may suggest with regard to the asset correlations, that the standard correlation assumptions applied by CRAs should be higher for ABS and lower for CDO, HEL and MBS securitizations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
. Standard errors are in parentheses. The significance is indicated as follows: ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. The deal categories are asset backed security (ABS), collateralized debt obligation (CDO), commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS), home equity loan security(HEL) and residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS). The time specific random effects are significant. The ramification is that CRA ratings do not fully account for systematic risk, that systematic risk increases with rating quality, and that HEL, CDO and RMBS are more cyclical than other transaction categories.
Panel A: Rating at the beginning of the years 
. Standard errors are in parentheses. The significance is indicated as follows: ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. The time specific random effects are significant. The parameter estimate b is greater after CRA ratings are included. The ramification is that CRA ratings do not explain (and may increase) systematic risk.
(1) This table shows parameter estimates from the probit model. The model specification is P (D ijt = 1) = Φ (α + β · t). t = (year − 1996) and counts the number of years from the beginning of the observation period and is thus a year effect. Standard errors are in parentheses. The significance is indicated as follows: ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. The passage of time from the beginning of the observation period is significant. The ramification is that CRA rating standards have declined over time.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) This table shows the results of out-of-sample prediction probit regression Model 10. The model specification is P (D ijt+1 = 1) = Φ (γ 0 + γ 1ηijt+1 ). Standard errors are in parentheses. The significance is indicated as follows: ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. The tested hypotheses are that γ 0 = 0 and γ 1 = 1. The estimated parameters γ 0 and γ 1 are statistically different from γ 0 = 0 and γ 1 = 1. The ramification is that CRA ratings do not predict impairment risk.
(1) (2) (3) (4) This table shows the results of out-of-sample prediction linear regression Model 11. The model specification is D ijt+1 = δ 0 + δ 1 ·p ijt+1 + ε ijt+1 . Standard errors are in parentheses. The significance is indicated as follows: ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. The tested hypotheses are that δ 0 = 0 and δ 1 = 1. The estimated parameters δ 0 and δ 1 are statistically different from δ 0 = 0 and δ 1 = 1. The ramification is that CRA ratings do not predict impairment risk.
(1) (2) This table shows parameter estimates from the probit model Model 12. The model specification is P (D ijt = 1) = Φ (β x ijt ). Standard errors are in parentheses. The significance is indicated as follows: ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. The parameter for resecuritisation can not be estimated for ABS and HEL as resecuritisations can not be identified for these categories. AUROC is the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (see Agresti 1984) . For the categories CDO, MBS and HEL, the parameter for ORY is positive and significant, which suggests that the impairment risk in the origination year is higher than suggested by the CRA. The ramification is that financial risk for the asset classes CDO, MBS and HEL is higher than implied by ratings and structural elements in original rating years.
